In August 2014, Islamic State (ISIS) jihadists overtook the Sinjar mountains of northern Iraq, committing widespread killing and abductions of Yazidi community members. Five years later, there is no comprehensive policy or programme to provide accountability and redress to survivors of ISIS. This article presents results from in-depth interviews with 117 Yazidi refugees resettled in the German Federal State of Baden-Wü rttemberg in 2015-16 through the 'Special Quota' humanitarian assistance programme. The results provide an empirical assessment of Yazidi survivors' views on justice and accountability. They also explore the tensions that exist at the intersection of global and national considerations for justice and reconciliation, and local values, needs, and priorities. The immediate need to find the missing and reunify families, and ensuring the safety and wellbeing of family members remaining in Iraq, are the respondents' highest priority. The respondents also expressed a strong desire for truth and accountability. Recognition of the genocide, truthseeking, and criminal prosecution are seen as important steps individually, and towards the protection of Yazidis as a group. The article addresses how those views relate to the possibility of a just and peaceful future in Iraq and the context of transitional justice options that have been proposed in response to ISIS crimes.
Introduction
What they did to us, l wish they'll live through the same. 1 In August 2014, jihadists affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) overtook the Sinjar mountains of northern Iraq, Nineveh governorate. The mountains, home to the Yazidi minority group, became the scene of mass killing, abductions, and destruction. Tens of thousands of Yazidis fled to neighbouring governorates. As many as 9,900 Yazidis-2.5 per cent of the Yazidi population of Iraq-were either killed or kidnapped directly after the August 2014 attacks (Cetorelli et al. 2017: 1) . More died in the following year and many remain missing. The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria documented a pattern of Yazidi 'men being killed or forced to convert; of women and girls, some as young as nine, sold at market and held in sexual slavery by ISIS fighters; and of boys ripped from their families and forced into ISIS training camps' (UN Human Rights Council 2016: 3) .
Incremental efforts by Iraqi and other armed forces ended the violence in late 2017, but few Yazidis have returned to Sinjar since. Despite advocacy efforts and international support, prospects for justice for the Yazidi people and others affected by ISIS remain grim. Five years after the genocidal actions of ISIS, there is no comprehensive policy or programme to provide accountability and redress. For Yazidis, the failure to achieve some form of justice has been compounded by a lack of integration of their priorities and conditions in transitional justice considerations. Despite significant advocacy work by Yazidis themselves, there has been little systematic empirical assessment of Yazidi survivors' views on justice and accountability and how those views relate to the possibility of a peaceful future for Iraq.
This article examines the views and experience of a group of Yazidi refugees, part of a larger group who were resettled in Germany through a 'Special Quota' humanitarian assistance programme implemented by the government of the German Federal State of Baden-Wü rttemberg from 2015-16. It is part of a broader project to examine perceptions and attitudes about peace and justice among conflict-affected communities in Iraq.
The unique local and cultural particularities of this group of Yazidis provide the backdrop for an exploration of the tension that arises when global and national considerations of justice and reconciliation mechanisms clash with local values, needs and priorities. The article examines the perceptions and expectations of the Yazidi refugees against the context of accountability options proposed in response to ISIS crimes and discusses the implications of the findings for transitional justice policy and practices. This analysis sits among many other efforts (including by the authors) to interrogate what justice and reconciliation mean locally, especially among minority groups, and how (if at all) they can be achieved through global or national transitional justice mechanisms.
Background

Transitional justice and survivors of violence
The last decades of transitional justice endeavours have seen the confluence of two potentially paradoxical trends. On the one hand, countries emerging from civil wars, political repression and other forms of violence have continued to embrace an increasingly structured and globalized normative set of top-down mechanisms composed of criminal prosecutions, 1 All direct quotes are from Yazidi respondents interviewed in our study in Germany in late 2017.
Perspectives on Justice and Reconciliation among Yazidi Women Refugees in Germany truth commissions, reparation programmes, and other institutional reforms to address legacies of the past. On the other hand, the localization of transitional justice has equally been embraced by national and global actors, recognizing that local practices, needs and priorities must drive a bottom-up conception of transitional justice mechanisms. This recognition, however, has generally fallen short of a fundamental rethinking of how transitional justice could work as a potentially more informal, grassroots, spontaneous, and/or locally relevant process. Rather, as Shaw and Waldorf suggest, the localization agenda tends not to challenge the foundational conceptualization and ideologies of transitional justice (Shaw and Waldorf 2010) .
Transitional justice, then, exists in an uneasy space between local needs and priorities and structural measures guided by global norms, even when they are implemented nationally with or without international involvement. Scholars have explored how local politics, social dynamics, and justice practices influence the course of transitional justice in various contexts (e.g. Waldorf 2006) . Some research analyses how competing cultural paradigms affect transitional justice, particularly international vs. local norms, while others argue for more participatory, bottom-up transitional justice practices (e.g. Lundy and McGovern 2008) . Place-based research, notably in Rwanda and Uganda, has discussed the tensions between different mechanisms (official amnesty vs. local ceremonies, international justice vs. national proceedings) and between priorities (peace vs. justice) (e.g. Baines 2005; Pham et al. 2005; Vinck and Pham 2014) . While almost two decades old, these questions have not been resolved, as illustrated by the tenuous peace agreement reached in Colombia in 2016, which fell short of meeting survivors' expectations for justice.
Another set of research to which this article contributes examines the effectiveness of transitional justice for conflict-affected populations and/or victims of violence. Authors have theorized that beyond the moral, societal, and normative reasons to bring wrongdoers to justice, the benefits of transitional justice measures for survivors may include promoting individual healing, rehabilitation and reconciliation. Transitional justice may help to remove the survivor's fear of renewed violence, overcome stigma by providing recognition of the survivor's suffering, and build survivors' confidence that they live in a society that condemns the type of treatment they experienced (Cullinan and Bruce-Mitford 2001) . However, the true impact of these processes is not easily evaluated. Research in Colombia found that survivors who received reparations felt recognized and empowered and showed increased confidence in the state (Sikkink et al. 2015) . The way that transitional justice is implemented appears to matter. Witnesses who testified both in international courts and in truth commissions found it to be a positive, empowering experience, but only when the witness felt respected and had their experiences acknowledged throughout the process (Henry 2009: 134) . However, the views and effects of transitional justice mechanisms may vary among survivors. After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, those with symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) were less likely to favour local justice processes and less likely to believe in the possibility of community reconciliation than those without such symptoms (Pham et al. 2004: 608-9) .
These studies highlight the continued need to examine empirically what transitional justice accomplishes for survivors of violence (Weinstein 2011: 3) . Critically, they point to the possibility that the way in which policy mechanisms are perceived by their intended beneficiaries determines their success. This article seeks to examine Yazidi women's understandings and expectations of justice, their knowledge of ongoing or proposed justice efforts, and their perceptions of those efforts, with a view to informing transitional justice policy development and implementation.
Transitional justice in Iraq
Iraq's reckoning with its violent past has been an ongoing challenge since the invasion of the country by a United States-led coalition and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Violence and abuses under Saddam Hussein's regime were confronted through efforts at criminal prosecution, truth-seeking and some reparations for survivors. These efforts, however, largely failed to provide the desired peace dividends and were often subject to politicization along sectarian lines (Daly 2014) . Sectarian violence since 2003 created new demands for accountability. In 2014, ISIS capitalized on the growing tensions between Iraq's Sunni minority and the Shia-led government to take control of the north-western part of the country. The group brutally enforced its view of conservative Islamic traditions, exacerbating societal breakdown and sectarianism in Iraq. At its height, ISIS controlled a population estimated at seven to eight million people. The district of Sinjar, which Yazidis have inhabited for centuries, was within the area ISIS occupied. Yazidi history includes repeated episodes of persecution, and although all populations who lived under ISIS experienced grave violations, the group singled out the Yazidis by forcing them to convert, imposing measures to prevent Yazidi children from being born, and subjecting them to slavery (UN Human Rights Council 2016: 9, 12, 27) .
The Iraqi Prime Minister announced the defeat of ISIS in Iraq in early December 2017, and by March 2019 the group had lost the last of the territory it once held. The organizational structure of ISIS suffered significant losses during the military campaign, but analysts believe the group remains a significant security threat.
The defeat of ISIS in Iraq ushered the country into a new period of accountability and transitional justice efforts aimed at dealing with past violence. Yet despite the decline of ISIS, progress in establishing justice and accountability measures remains slow.
In the months following the attacks in Sinjar, human rights actors quickly called on the government of Iraq to accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to permit the investigation of the alleged crimes. In April 2015, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda confirmed that her office had received information on ISIS crimes, however, the office declined to open a preliminary examination. The Prosecutor's policy is to only investigate those with the greatest responsibility for the crimes. The information submitted showed that nationals of state parties to the ICC had been involved, but that the leadership of ISIS was comprised of nationals of Iraq and Syria which are not states parties, meaning the ICC would not have personal jurisdiction over them (ICC 2015) . Since 2015, Yazidi civil society groups and international actors have repeatedly urged the ICC to reconsider. They have also called on the government of Iraq to accept ICC jurisdiction, and on the UN Security Council to refer the situation to the ICC (e.g. Yazda and Free Yezidi Foundation 2015) . The Syria Commission of Inquiry, in its June 2016 report to the Human Rights Council, became the first UN body to find that ISIS crimes against Yazidis amounted to genocide. It too called for a Security Council referral to the ICC or to an ad hoc tribunal. 2 While no international (or hybrid) court has been given jurisdiction to address ISIS crimes, there have been extensive domestic legal proceedings against ISIS members and 2 Although the findings and recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry are significant, they are not binding as a matter of law (UN Human Rights Council 2016: 37) .
suspected members in Iraq. Observers point to a range of problems in the way these proceedings are being carried out, however. First, the Iraqi Penal Code does not currently include genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The crimes are included in the subject matter jurisdiction of the Iraqi High Criminal Tribunal (IHT), established after 2003, however, its temporal jurisdiction is limited to the period between July 1968 and May 2003. Some proposals have been made to address this deficit, including reviving the IHT with an updated statute, revising the Iraqi Penal Code to include international crimes, or creating a new judicial body (Physicians for Human Rights 2017: 11). Another concern is that the Iraqi Penal Code is currently inconsistent with international standards in its treatment of crimes of sexual and gender-based violence, notably its definition and treatment of rape. Iraqi law does, however, prohibit forced marriage, kidnapping, and human trafficking (Van Schaack 2018: 126). Second, NGOs and the media have reported extensively on Iraqi government and Kurdistan Regional Government forces detaining thousands of suspected ISIS fighters and affiliates since the beginning of the military campaign against ISIS. In late 2017, Human Rights Watch reported that at least 7,374 suspects had been either tried or convicted since 2014, of whom 92 were executed. All of these cases have involved charges of terrorism, with a few kidnapping charges, and most have taken place in counter-terrorism courts, out of the public eye. Critically, reports point to serious procedural flaws in the 'terrorism trials'. Trials are reported to take little time, involve general questioning with limited opportunity for the accused to present defences, and often result in a sentence of life imprisonment or the death penalty. A 2016 law grants amnesty to those who joined ISIS against their will and did not commit any other serious crimes, however, the law is reportedly proving challenging for judges to interpret and implement (Human Rights Watch 2017: 1-4). While some of the perpetrators tried by the counter-terrorism courts may have committed crimes against Yazidis, there is no evidence that anyone in Iraq or Kurdistan has been held accountable for the sexual slavery that defined the campaign by ISIS against Yazidi women (Human Rights Watch 2019a: 1). Furthermore, there are currently no measures in place to engage survivors in the process either as witnesses or as survivor participants, leaving the survivors remote from the terrorism trials.
With pursuit of international crimes on hold pending a court of competent jurisdiction, activists and some governments turned their attention to preserving the existing evidence with a view to future transitional justice measures. In September 2017, in response to the Iraqi government's request for international support, the UN Security Council created the Iraq Independent Investigative Team to investigate violations of international law in the conflict with ISIS. The head of the investigative team was appointed in July 2018 and it began planning the implementation of its mandate shortly thereafter. UN Security Council resolution 2379 outlines the investigative team's mandate: to find and store documentation and work alongside survivors to prepare evidence for 'fair and independent criminal proceedings'. The team is mandated to investigate only ISIS, and the documentation it gathers is primarily destined for use in Iraqi legal processes, with the possibility of sharing evidence with third countries on request (UN Security Council 2017). Other countries, including Germany, have made significant efforts to prosecute ISIS members in their own legal systems under universal jurisdiction. The Kurdistan Regional Government has also had a fact-finding and documentation body in place since late 2014, known as the High Committee for Recognition of the Genocide of Yazidis and Other Minorities (the Genocide Committee). The Genocide Committee created a Commission of Investigation and Gathering Evidence to investigate and collect evidence of crimes committed in Sinjar and the Nineveh Plains. The committee primarily gathers witness testimony with a view to potential future judicial actions, and it refers cases to other offices providing support and services to survivors, including those attempting to rescue abductees, protect mass graves and locate missing persons. In June 2017, the Higher Judicial Council of Iraq created an investigative body with a similar mandate, under Iraqi central government jurisdiction. 3 It is unclear, however, to what degree these bodies are coordinating in implementing their mandates (Physicians for Human Rights 2017: 18).
As a result of the large numbers of civilians kidnapped and killed by ISIS, locating survivors who remain missing and opening grave sites to identify remains are high priorities for survivor communities. An estimated 3,000 Yazidis remained missing as of early 2019. The Yazidi community hoped that captives would be found when territory was reclaimed from ISIS, but only a small number were released after Mosul was liberated in 2017, and again when the last ISIS-held territories in Syria were recaptured in 2019 (Al-Saiedi 2018; Voice of America 2019).
Iraq's Law on the Protection of Mass Graves (2005) governs the opening of grave sites for identification of remains. In Sinjar, the Yazidi NGO, Yazda, documented the location of 35 mass graves in 2016 and found that they were largely unprotected and exposed, with bones, clothing, and other items scattered above ground (Yazda and Free Yezidi Foundation 2015) . However, lack of cooperation between the central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government had prevented the exhumation of the graves in the Sinjar area since 2014 (Huson 2017) . But in March 2019 the retrieval of forensic evidence began in Kocho, Sinjar, carried out by Iraq's Mass Graves Directorate and Medico-Legal Directorate, and the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal of the Kurdistan Regional Government, with support from the Investigative Team (Kurdistan24 2019).
In addition to criminal accountability and truth-seeking efforts, the Iraqi government ordered in March 2018 that reparations be paid to every Yazidi released from ISIS captivity. However, awards are to be processed through a pre-existing compensation commission that has experienced a variety of challenges and is not without controversy because of the complex and costly procedures and accusations of nepotism and corruption.
Methods
This research involves a series of interviews conducted as part of a mixed-method panel study among Yazidi women refugees in the state of Baden-Wü rttemberg, Germany, in 2017 and 2018, in partnership with the Psychosomatic Medicine and Psychotherapy Department at the Medical University Hospital at Tü bingen. Institutional review board approval for the study was obtained from the Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health in Boston, Massachusetts, and the Clinical Ethics Committee of the University Hospital, Tü bingen, in Baden-Wü rttemberg.
Study population: the Special Quota project
The government of the German Federal State of Baden-Wü rttemberg established the 'Special Quota' project as a humanitarian assistance programme that aimed at resettling in 3 The Iraqi Constitution of 2005 recognizes an autonomous region in the north of the country governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Germany up to 1,000 women and children deemed to need special protection. The project was open to women and children of any ethnic or religious identity if they met the criteria of having experienced severely traumatizing experiences, especially sexual violence, in the context of the violent conflict in Syria and northern Iraq, and of having spent time in internal displacement camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In practice, the majority of the project's participants were Yazidi women and children who had fled ISIS. During the application process, they received a medical examination and were interviewed by German psychological experts who evaluated whether they fit the project's criteria. From March 2015 until January 2016, 1,100 women and children were resettled in Baden-Wü rttemberg and two other German states. Since arriving in Germany, the women have had a temporary residence permit for two years, with the right to apply for permanent residence afterwards and the right to later apply for family reunification according to German Asylum Law. They also receive accommodation in secure and separate buildings (or 'accommodation centres'), access to medical treatment for any injuries, and access to psychological treatment. They have the right to leave the project at any time and to return to Iraq.
The study population included all Special Quota project participants aged 18 years or older at the time of the interview. Out of the project's total 1,100 participants, an estimated 40 per cent were aged 18 years or older when they arrived in Germany in 2015-16. The study invited every Special Quota project participant aged 18 years and older to participate. We chose a voluntary recruitment method because we wanted all eligible persons to have the chance to participate and to avoid creating pressure to participate. There were 117 total participants in 2017. Among the interview respondents, all had experienced the August 2014 ISIS attacks in Sinjar, and many had experienced sexual violence, been forced to flee, or witnessed the death of family members.
Instrument
The interviews employed a questionnaire about perceptions of justice and accountability developed by the authors. The instrument included both structured and open-ended questions administered using a digital form with separate audio recording of the interview for quality control and coding purposes. The interview's mixed-method approach was explained to participants at the beginning of the interview. Graphic representation of scales was used to facilitate the selection of responses.
Questions were initially developed in English and translated into German and the Kurmanji dialect spoken in the Sinjar region of Iraq where all respondents came from. Interviews were conducted by one member of the study team from Harvard or Tü bingen along with an interpreter. All study team members and interpreters took part in several days of training prior to data collection during which each question and the most accurate Kurmanji translation were discussed and agreed upon.
Procedures
Each interview took place in private locations at the women's homes (the accommodation centres) and lasted approximately one and a half hours. Only female interviewers and interpreters conducted the interviews. The interviews took place over a period of approximately 14 weeks from late August 2017 to early January 2018. 4 The study was introduced to 4 A second phase of data collection took place from August 2018 to January 2019. This article reports only the findings from the 2017-18 interviews.
potential participants through their social workers and accommodation centre managers.
The study team was in regular contact with the caregivers at each site to ensure the women were fully informed of the purpose of the study and aware that participation was entirely voluntary. At each study site, the study team made a presentation to any interested participants regarding the study goals, voluntariness, and potential benefits and risks. Prior to each interview, this information was discussed privately with each respondent before obtaining their written consent.
The interview data and audio files were encrypted and kept on secured servers. They were transcribed directly from Kurmanji into English; no Kurmanji transcript was produced because of the wide variation in written Kurmanji between districts of Iraq and Kurdistan. Transcribing directly to English was the most reliable way to ensure that transcribers could review and cross-reference each other's transcriptions.
Data analysis
The final structured quantitative questions of the datasets were imported into SPSS for statistical analysis. Open ended questions were transcribed, translated, and imported into Dedoose for coding and analysis based on a themed code tree developed through an inductive process. Five study team members conducted an initial thematic review of between eight and twelve transcripts each and identified major categories and sub-themes. These were then discussed by the team and combined to yield a code tree with 19 main categories (root codes), 51 subcategories (parent codes), and 354 codes. In Dedoose, one hundred interviews were coded and a count of code applications was used to observe the most commonly cited themes. Within those themes, excerpts are quoted in this article that provide a strong illustration of how that theme commonly emerges from the respondents' descriptions of their experiences and views.
Limitations
The all-inclusive and voluntary nature of the recruitment process was important to ensure that the women did not feel any undue pressure to participate and to reduce the risk of retraumatization. However, it is not clear how respondents who volunteered to participate differ from those who did not. They may be more outspoken, perhaps because of increased exposure to violence, or better able to cope with their trauma. Furthermore, the views of Yazidi women in Germany may not reflect the views of all Yazidi women, or of all Yazidis (men and women). It is also possible that responses were influenced by inaccurate recall, the desire to conform to an expected social narrative about the topic (social desirability), and concerns for the safety of relatives remaining in Iraq or the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The training of study staff and interpreters, the explanation of the consent form, the private nature of the interviews, and the steps taken to ensure data confidentiality were all designed to reduce biases and errors. Nevertheless, in order to avoid influencing participants, constructs and terminology used for this study were not all defined or explained to them. Thus, they were free to interpret those concepts based on their own understanding. To address this limitation, we asked respondents to give their own definition of key concepts (e.g. justice, accountability), and throughout the questionnaire, we chose phrasing and translation that would avoid misunderstanding or misleading.
Results
Profile of respondents
Among the 117 Special Quota beneficiaries we interviewed, the average age was 32.2 (SD 8.2). All but one was female (99.1 per cent), as shown in Table 1 . More than half were married, 28 per cent were single, and 12 per cent were widowed. Among married women, over 30 per cent reported that their spouse was missing and 35 per cent that they were still in Iraq. For most with a missing spouse, they reported they were with ISIS or they simply had no contact with them. Nearly all self-identified both their religion and their ethnicity as Yazidi (99.1 per cent and 88.9 per cent respectively). One respondent self-identified their religion as Christian, and ten self-identified their ethnicity as Kurdish. About 63 per cent of the participants reported that they can read and write a basic text, however 85 per cent of the participants had a primary level education or less. Around 13 per cent of respondents worked outside their homes before the ISIS attacks, mostly in farming and a few in hairdressing or sewing.
Over ninety per cent of the respondents met the symptom criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at the time of the 2017 interviews. 5 This article does not explore their mental health in detail, but the prevalence of PTSD is indicative of the extent of their trauma and how it may shape the perceptions they express. 5 92.7 per cent of the sample had a score above a cut-off of 33 on the Impact of Event Scale-revised. A cut-off score of 33 has been found to best serve diagnostic accuracy (see Creamer et al. 2003 ).
Priorities, assistance and prospects for peace
Early in the interview, respondents were asked two open-ended questions about their current concerns and priorities, and what they needed most to rebuild their lives. By far the most common priority was family reunification, meaning the respondents' need to be reunited with loved ones still in Iraq, missing, or captive. Almost all respondents discussed having missing family members. Family separation, meaning experiencing or witnessing families being forced to separate from each other, was also the type of violence by ISIS that the respondents most commonly mentioned. The need to find family members, to discover or determine their fate, and to be able to live together again was a preoccupation for almost all respondents. Some respondents also described the fear they felt for the safety and welfare of their family members in captivity or remaining in Iraq.
I have three kids here and three there. Two sons, a little daughter and my husband, they're all still captives there. All I want is to have them again, and if I won't, I will die broken-hearted.
My family. They're captured, they're hungry. They will either be killed, or they live this every day.
After reunification, the most common priorities were daily measures that would help rebuild their lives, especially to obtain an education for themselves and their children, to find employment, and to live independently. A few respondents also mentioned wanting to see the situation improve in Iraq and improving their own health. More generally, when asked what should be done for victims, respondents focused on the need for international assistance and support, improving survivors' living conditions, and greater security and protection. Quite a few respondents believed that bringing survivors out of Iraq, to Europe or Germany, was the most desirable form of assistance and the best means to provide security.
They should be rescued from there just as I was rescued and came here and rebuilt my life in a safe place. I want that the ones who had been victims, like me, live in a safe place.
What has been done for us so far should be done for victims in Iraq also. Because they escape but there is no one to take care of them. . . . Not just the Yazidis, the others also.
For others, the priority was to help survivors who are still in camps for refugees and internally displaced people in Iraq, Kurdistan, or elsewhere. The importance of providing for basic needs such as nutrition and health care, schools, jobs, and rebuilding homes were all mentioned. Other forms of assistance were also cited less frequently such as the need for the release of captives, opening mass graves, repayment of debts incurred to escape ISIS, psychological help for survivors, and justice and understanding of the conflict. I want their situation to be improved because they do not have food to eat. They are in tents and face difficulties . . . If they rebuild their houses, they will not be in danger.
Perspectives on Justice and Reconciliation among Yazidi Women Refugees in Germany
As noted, few respondents mentioned the broader situation in Iraq as a priority. In part this may be explained by the overall pessimism about prospects for peace in Iraq expressed by many of the women interviewed. Almost 80 per cent believed it was either completely impossible or almost impossible to have peace in Iraq, as shown in Table 2 . Similarly, most (74 per cent) believed peace in the Middle East region to be either completely or almost impossible. Based on analysis of the open-ended questions, some were pessimistic about prospects for peace because they perceived ISIS as retaining a strong hold in the country. Historical experience of discord in Iraq also drove pessimism for some respondents.
There have always been problems in Iraq and those problems are going worse day by day. I am 29 and I have seen it going worse every passing year.
Some provided more detailed observations on the causes of instability in Iraq. For some, there is a need for a change of government or a change toward less divisive politics. Several respondents discussed religion as a central force in crises in Iraq. Distrust between Muslims and minority religious groups was a theme that recurred frequently throughout the interviews, and for some respondents it was a clear obstacle to peace for Yazidis. Defeating ISIS and allowing minorities to emigrate were also mentioned, though less often.
You know the Arab countries are always in conflict because of religions. There will always be wars and violence. They always attack those who are not from their religion. They say that Yezidi, Christian, Jews, or any other religions are not good people, only Muslims and Islam are the best. They say that all the world should be like them and convert to their religion.
Protection
Respondents recognized the complexity of achieving peace and security for the Yazidis, and several mentioned that recognition of the genocide was essential as it may mobilize greater protection for Yazidis. However, most did not specify who this recognition might come from; only a few mentioned international actors. We want to have our rights, assistance for the freedom of our lands, employment for our people in poverty. We are not asking for rights from other states. We want justice done for our young people who died there.
. . . if they announce it as genocide, we say maybe that they will provide international protection. International protection is important. Then, it may be a good place.
Several respondents specifically mentioned genocide trials as a key step towards security for Yazidis. In some cases, this was linked to ideas of justice and rights, but in others, the respondent was unclear about what a genocide trial is and how it would contribute to protection.
They should give justice, rights to Yazidis. They should make genocide trials.
It should be safe. There should be genocide trials so that it can be safe.
A more common proposition to ensure the protection of Yazidis was an independent homeland or protected region. For some, this would take the form of a Yazidi military force while others talked about international protection.
There's a lot that needs to be done. Yazidis should be armed, and they should have a land to build their lives on.
Justice
Most respondents defined 'justice' in terms of reclaiming rights or ensuring the rights of Yazidis are respected by law. Some described rights in terms of fairness, while others discussed a clear connection between punishment of perpetrators and restoration of rights. This is consistent with conceptions of justice in Iraq. The respondents mostly used the Arabic word 'adalah' for justice, which connotes evenness and equal treatment in relation to punishment. To restore equality, the punishment should fit the crime. These responses also exhibit the feelings of mistrust that many respondents feel toward Arabs and Muslims as a result of ISIS targeting Yazidis on the basis of their religion.
Justice, we mean holding people accountable for what they did. It means that people who committed atrocities get their punishment and we get our rights back.
We did nothing to deserve these incidents. These Arabs did them causelessly, there was no reason. So what they did to us, l wish they'll live through the same. That is justice.
Others saw justice as a form of equality and a government responsibility to ensure equal treatment regardless of religion, gender, or social status (such as wealth or political connections). The marginalization and fear of persecution among Yazidis comes through in these definitions.
It means that the state must protect people's rights, when some others persecute and fight Yazidis for their religion, they must tell people that Yazidis didn't create their religion as they wish, it's chosen for us by God's will, and these are our rights which they don't respect.
Several respondents defined justice in terms of God's will, either saying it is God who will give their rights back or who will punish ISIS.
I strongly believe in God's justice, and he'll get me my rights back.
Other definitions focused on helping the survivors, for example, seeing justice in terms of securing the release of captives and bringing families together in Germany. These themes recurred when the respondents were asked what form of justice or accountability would be acceptable to them. The most common idea of justice here was 'an eye for an eye': whatever ISIS did to Yazidis, they should receive similar treatment in return. For some, this response also reveals deep-seated fear of repetition and desire for revenge.
They have captured our girls and women, girls at the age of 13 or 14. They killed suckling babies. They killed all our men. If what happened to us, also happens to them, then I'd think that justice is secured.
They have cruelly tortured me. I'm still feeling scared when I see a bearded man here. If it was my decision, I would severely judge them. I'd do to them the same as they did to us.
I don't want them to get a bullet and then die, no, because they will be resting, and they will feel no pain when they die. That is unfair-why is it ok to rape a ten-year-old girl and nine-year-old to be raped by five or six men in the same time? Does he deserve one bullet?
The second most frequent type of justice measure that respondents mentioned was that ISIS members should experience physical punishment or be executed. Some simply stated that they wanted ISIS members dead, while others specifically described the link between what they experienced and their desire for ISIS members to be tortured to death.
So my daughter, she was not four months old even, I drank water from the toilet and fed her but she died. So we didn't see any good from them. I would kill them, break their teeth and cut their flesh.
If I got the chance to do it, I would have burned them all. I have a little cousin seven years old, at first they killed her father then they chained her, hanged her, put a net on her neck and suffocated her to death.
Other commonly mentioned types of justice were direct revenge (that is, the respondent wanting to punish ISIS members personally), and, to a lesser extent, trials. A few preferred international trials or the courts of another country over trials in Iraq.
The respondents most frequently believed that all members of ISIS should be held accountable, regardless of role or rank within the organization (for example, whether an ISIS member was a senior leader, commander, or fighter).
For me, all of them are the same, every one of them is eviler than the other. Those who were inside this, be it children, women, youth, commanders, for me they are all the same.
The second most common theme was that ISIS leaders should be punished more severely because they gave the orders to lower ranking members.
The highest ranked person because he was in position to assign other people as ISIS. There were people who cried over us, some of them did not dare to do anything. Some of them were drugged. Many of them were killed because they have retreated from war, they accused them of treason.
No, the leaders. There was a leader taking responsibility of girls. He was doing bad things to them and then selling them to his friends.
Other less frequent categories mentioned as meriting punishment include the respondent's direct captors, foreign fighters, and Muslims, particularly those who supported ISIS and failed to protect Yazidis. Several respondents mentioned the wives and children of ISIS members either as less blameworthy, because they had shown the captives kindness, or just as bad because they participated in the captivity.
When asked to explain why justice is important, respondents overwhelmingly pointed to the deep suffering ISIS had caused to them. Most clearly regarded it as self-evident that the need for justice comes directly from the extent of suffering.
It is important not because of anything, but just for the sake of those women and [girls] who are still in their captivity, for the sake of those men and boys who are in their captivity, and they're hungry, naked, and they are being tortured every day. They took my car, they took my properties, and they burned down my house that I had been building for seven years, but this is all nothing and we don't care about it. They should be held accountable because they killed young people who were about to go to universities and get married. They tortured kids. They sold girls.
Respondents overwhelmingly reported that achieving justice (92 per cent) and holding accountable those who committed violence against civilians during the conflict with ISIS (97 per cent) were extremely important (as shown in Table 3 ). Respondents, however, were uncertain that they would ever obtain justice. As Table 3 also shows, respondents were most frequently 'not at all' optimistic (45.3 per cent), while almost 20 per cent were 'extremely' optimistic. More than three-quarters of respondents reported that they were not aware of any current efforts to bring to justice those responsible for the violence and 22 per cent were aware of such efforts, mostly mentioning non-governmental initiatives and actors such as Nadia Murad, a former captive of ISIS who has advocated for justice and was awarded the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize, or Farida Abbas Khalaf, who published a memoir documenting her experience as a Yazidi survivor of ISIS.
In the qualitative data, most of those who commented on the likelihood of justice suggested their pessimism is because Yazidis have received no help or justice in the past, and because ISIS members are beyond reach, either having fled from Iraq, living in hiding, or living freely inside Iraq or elsewhere without government willingness to prosecute them. Some further elaborated their sense of powerlessness.
There's nothing in our power. Yazidis have nothing in their hands. There's nothing we can do.
Whatever they do, they won't be able to bring ISIS to justice. Nothing will happen against ISIS.
The respondents almost unanimously stated that it is not possible to forgive those responsible for the violence (see Table 3) . When asked open-endedly what could happen that might allow them to forgive, very few had any response. A small number stated that forgiveness might be possible if their missing relatives were brought back but most respondents simply do not foresee that forgiveness is possible. A few linked this impossibility to the impossibility of redressing their harms.
As long as I live I will not forgive, when someone kills children and old people and men, how could you forgive them? I will not forgive them. If they come in front of me I would cut them to pieces with a knife. They killed my children; how would I forgive them?
Because they can never give us back what they took from us. Even if they give the world to us, it can never match what they took from us. There can never be any compensation for what they did to us.
Truth
Most respondents (79 per cent) stated that it is extremely important to them to know the truth about what happened. As shown in Table 4 , large majorities also believed it is important for the world (93 per cent) and future generations (87 per cent) to know. The most commonly cited reason for the world and future generations to know what happened was that this would allow Yazidis and others to prevent similar violence in the future. Several respondents mentioned that passing on knowledge of the attacks will prevent repetition of the history of persecution and massacres against Yazidis.
Future generations must know everything about ISIS violations against Yazidis, so they can take precautions so that tragedy won't happen again with them.
Yes, it's very important. I want them to know because there were old genocides against Yazidis. Our grandparents told us about them, but other people don't know them.
Another very common theme was that the crimes were of such magnitude that the whole world should know about them, and that they must be recognized and preserved in the memory and history of Yazidis.
Because they are so violently oppressing people. They commit such unbelievable crimes . . . The whole world has to know what ISIS is doing. Several respondents commented on what they believe is the best means of spreading and preserving the memory of the ISIS attacks. Here, the most frequent theme is that the story should be passed down from generation to generation. Others mentioned writing books and recording an accurate version of history.
I keep telling my children and grandchildren and they will tell their kids, so this genocide won't be ignored or forgotten. It must be saved in our history. Notably, for almost 13 per cent of respondents, knowing more about what happened was not at all important (see Table 4 ). A small number said that they simply did not want to remember what happened. A few others did not want future generations to know so they would not have to live with the painful legacy. A minority also felt that recognition would be futile and would provide little comfort compared to the scale of their suffering. Most respondents were not familiar with the concept of a 'Truth Commission' (86 per cent). To explore further whether such a commission would be welcomed by the respondents, they were provided the following concise definition: 'Truth Commissions investigate a pattern of crimes over a period of time; they are temporary and end with a report; and they are officially created by the government of the country.' Most respondents (85 per cent) believed that it would be appropriate to have such a commission for ISIS crimes, while some (15 per cent) did not support the idea. Those who commented on why a commission would be welcome generally saw it as a basic step toward justice and so that the world could know what happened to them. Some expressed scepticism that such a commission would be effective, that it would not change anything concretely for Yazidis, or that it would not provide them with any real sense of justice since ISIS members remain free and deserve harsher punishment.
Yes, it is important for us that they collect this information, that people know about it. But ISIS is in Kurdistan, so there are ISIS in the camps.
No, it's not enough. It's not enough even if they tell us that they killed all of them. We need to see that ourselves.
Discussion
It has been more than 5 years since the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) committed atrocities against the Yazidi community. The findings from this study paint a picture of a group of survivors of extreme trauma still grappling with the profound personal impact of their losses. The results suggest three interrelated areas of focus in terms of transitional justice and recovery among study respondents: 1) identifying, locating and, if possible, reuniting with missing relatives; 2) providing for basic needs, restoring the community's ability to meet them, and protecting the community; and 3) justice, accountability, forgiveness and truth.
For most respondents, the primary preoccupation is to find out where their missing spouses, children, and/or other family members are, or to reunite with those with whom they currently have contact in Iraq, Kurdistan, and elsewhere. This has implications for the Special Quota beneficiaries themselves: those who are in contact with their relatives clearly want them to come to Germany, but this is only possible through Germany's current procedures for refugee family reunification, which have been criticized because they are limited to spouses and under-age children and subject to strict requirements (such as no dependency on social benefits), and because of lengthy administrative processes and delays. Family reunification remains a politically divisive topic in Germany, in part because of the large numbers of recent refugees aspiring to reunite with their family members. Policies may change, meaning that Special Quota beneficiaries have no certainty of bringing family members to Germany.
The desire to locate missing relatives is also relevant to current efforts to address accountability in Iraq. The Investigative Team has prioritized the opening of mass graves in Sinjar, and there is new progress in forensic exhumation. Efforts to locate missing persons and rescue captives also continued throughout the military campaign against ISIS. However, as noted, few Yazidis were found either in Mosul or more recently when the last areas of Syria were recaptured. The respondents in this study are aware of these efforts to a limited degree: they report that they seek news from Iraq primarily in order to hear about progress in the conflict and whether more people have returned from captivity. Their main sources of information are friends and family via social media. Now that ISIS no longer holds territory in Iraq or Syria, the numbers returning have declined. The effect of this development for the survivors in Germany and elsewhere will only become clear over time, but as investigative efforts (such as exhumations) continue, there may be opportunities to provide more reliable information to the survivors and to engage them more directly.
The second major theme highlights the priority the respondents accord to security and relates to their own basic needs and those of their relatives. Quite a few of the respondents in Germany were committed to continuing their own education and all are learning the language. Most of those who have children placed a great deal of importance on their children's education. They see this as necessary to gaining employment and integrating in Germany. After the hope of family reunification, the opportunities that Germany affords to them and their children was by far the most frequent source of optimism about the future. They also see securing and restoring their homeland as an essential measure of redress. The Yazidi ethno-religious identity is strongly linked to their ancestral land and geographic location; this explains in part the importance to them of establishing the preconditions for Yazidis to return home, including guarantees of security and the return of their land. It also relates to their concerns for the daily well-being of their relatives who remain living in 'tents' in Iraq (camps) or in captivity. When describing their own captivity, one of the aspects the respondents mentioned most frequently was the lack of basic needs such as food, warmth, clothing and sanitation.
The physiological and safety needs expressed by respondents were theorized by Maslow (Wahba and Bridwell 1976) as the basic needs that must be at least partially met before individuals can attend to higher order needs-in this case, the needs for truth, accountability and justice. Currently, because basic physical and safety needs are still lacking for their family members and community, the respondents consistently point to the need for protection and restoration of basic livelihoods. The findings support the growing voices calling for 'transformative' approaches to post-conflict transitions that would integrate transitional justice measures more closely with broader humanitarian, peacebuilding and development agendas (e.g. Gready and Robins 2014) .
Reparations programmes are often the area where transitional justice contributes most directly to meeting survivors' essential needs. Precedents for such measures include the awards of mental health assistance and symbolic restitution by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC); the assistance mandate of the ICC's Trust Fund for Victims, which has allowed it to provide both physical and psychosocial rehabilitation to survivors of violence in countries where the situation is under investigation by the ICC; and the humanitarian assistance programme created as part of Colombia's Unit for Comprehensive Attention and Reparation of Victims. The Colombian Victim Unit has provided not only reparations for survivors but also humanitarian assistance to those affected by the conflict.
With respect to justice, the participants report a clear desire for justice which they defined in terms of punishing ISIS members and the restoration of their rights. A study carried out in Iraq in 2003 after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein found similarly that justice and human rights are seen as an inverse image of what the respondents experienced (ICTJ and Human Rights Center 2004) . The path to get justice, ironically, also mirrors their experiences. Many invoked harsh physical punishments as well as the death penalty, and some articulated the desire to carry out the sentence themselves. The respondents see punishment as an integral part of protecting their rights, which is consistent with prevailing views of justice in Iraq as 'an eye for an eye'. With this conception of justice, the punishment should be commensurate to the crime it redresses in order to restore balance to the relationship between the wrongdoer and the person who was harmed. As such, the vision of justice is primarily backward-looking (punitive) yet the notion of punishment is also seen as a means towards safety. This suggests a more forward-looking concern for the prevention of future crimes. In 2003, Iraqis similarly expressed overwhelming support for the death penalty for Saddam Hussein and other regime members, with some interviewees also wanting prolonged torture prior to execution (ibid.). The Yazidi respondents in Germany echo this 'eye for an eye' concept when they state that death alone might let ISIS off too lightly by letting them escape responsibility for their crimes. It is possible that the respondents' desire to see ISIS members tortured or to personally inflict the punishment is purely ideational: most respondents did not identify any specific entity or actor that should carry out the acts.
Furthermore, the respondents' views of justice are like those in other post-conflict countries, where traditional forms of justice are often the first avenue for recourse after wrongdoing. Our surveys in a wide range of countries with diverse social and cultural contexts, from Timor-Leste to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, and others, show that where people go to seek justice is largely dominated by traditional mechanisms or local norms. This may reflect a lack of knowledge about formal justice processes and other barriers to accessing formal justice institutions, such as physical distance, high cost, or mistrust. Most if not all the respondents in this study had no prior interactions with the formal justice system. Thus, future transitional justice measures for Yazidis need to clearly engage survivors in the design process of mechanisms anchored in formal systems that are largely foreign to them. This includes managing expectations about what formal justice processes can and cannot realistically do.
Some respondents know about and favour trials, but almost all supported having ISIS members sentenced to death. Like many countries in the Middle East region, Iraq still employs the death penalty for numerous crimes including murder, terrorism, kidnapping, and rape. Iraq in fact has one of the highest execution rates in the world (Van Schaack 2018: 134) . But while this demand may be rooted in both prevailing public attitudes and state policy, it is in direct opposition to international human rights values which hold that the death penalty is a violation of the fundamental right to life and a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (UNAMI and OHCHR 2014: 2-3). The issue will therefore continue to present challenges to the pursuit of justice for ISIS crimes if international stakeholders will be involved, as is likely. International opposition to the death penalty was one factor that delayed the establishment of the International Investigative Team and later the finalization of its terms of reference (Van Schaack 2018: 135) . Possible solutions to this issue include continued international political pressure on Iraq to not enforce the death penalty, or Iraqi implementation of an accountability process with international support that excludes the death penalty.
The demand for the death penalty also raises the challenge of managing the interests and expectations of survivors. Some of the survivors' desires in terms of capital punishment may shift over time due to a variety of factors. In Uganda in 2005, 17 per cent of study respondents believed that a person found guilty of a grave crime such as murder or rape should receive the death penalty, and in 2010, this had increased to 68 per cent (Pham and Vinck 2010: 44) . Based on the results of this study and previous research in Iraq, abolition is not likely to be welcomed by survivors of violence. But if a legitimate form of accountability is implemented fairly and transparently, other punishments could become acceptable alternatives. A similar shift in thinking was observed in Cambodia, where study respondents who viewed the ECCC as a fair process were more willing to accept not getting financial reparations (Pham et al. 2011: 35-6) . Public information and education can also be considered as means to gain support for abolition if this is desired and needed.
Another clear area of tension with human rights values is the protection of the rights of accused perpetrators, especially in proceedings where the death penalty is imposed. Recent reporting on Iraqi terrorism trials suggests that some courts, particularly those in Nineveh where the largest number of ISIS suspects are being tried, have made significant improvements in the procedures employed during terrorism trials. These improvements are promising; however, they have not yet been adopted across the board by other courts. As a result, those suspected of ISIS affiliation are still being sentenced to death after cursory investigations and trials (Human Rights Watch 2019b; Taub 2018; New York Times 2018). This is highly problematic from a due process standpoint and merits further attention and resources from both governmental authorities and international actors.
The results of this study show that Yazidi women, at least those in Germany, are not well aware of any form of justice process attempting to address the violence they experienced. Among those who are aware, most only know about civil society's activism. Although accountability for ISIS crimes in Iraq and internationally has been slow, fragmented and halting, there are efforts under way such as international and domestic investigations, and prosecutions in European countries. Thousands of ISIS suspects are in detention and hundreds have been tried in Iraq, but these processes are largely unknown to survivors. They are administered through the counter-terrorism courts which are not designed to provide information to survivors or allow survivor participation. This raises an opportunity, in the absence of a formal transitional justice process, to provide more information to survivors about these efforts. Under Iraq's civil law system, survivor petitions also play an important role in moving cases forward, suggesting a potentially valuable role for civil society and international donors in supporting survivor mobilization.
The respondents' views towards forgiveness should also be taken into account in future transitional justice processes and efforts to build peace in Iraq. The almost uniform unwillingness to forgive is clearly connected in the respondents' minds to the extent of their suffering; respondents were sometimes indignant at being asked the question and their responses spoke about forgiveness as an unimaginable possibility. Only a very small number of respondents stated that if they were reunified with their relatives, they may be able to forgive. Given the unique situation of the respondents in this study, the findings cannot be generalized to the entire Yazidi community or others affected by ISIS. Other research on perceptions of reconciliation among displaced Yazidis in Iraq, however, has found that 'those who witnessed the brutality inflicted against their community and family members first hand were notably more opposed to the idea of reconciliation. To them, the concept of reconciliation was often connected to forgiveness, which implied impunity, and an endpoint few participants understandably were able to consider' (Van Zoonen and Wirya 2017: 14) . . This is comparable to other post-conflict settings: data from Cambodia three decades after the Khmer Rouge similarly shows that survivors who lived under the regime were more likely to feel hatred toward the Khmer Rouge and less likely to forgive (Pham et al. 2009: 3) . Those who had higher levels of post-traumatic stress disorder were also less willing to forgive.
The unwillingness to forgive is relevant to the issue of accountability for crimes against Yazidis in several ways. First, transitional justice measures are often launched with either an explicit or implicit goal of facilitating reconciliation. Perhaps because of the influential early example of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where a process of repentance and forgiveness was central, forgiveness is often seen as essential to building individuals' capacity for overcoming past grievances and coexisting peacefully with former wrongdoers (e.g. Saunders 2011). The respondents' views in this study suggest that this approach may not be well received by Yazidi survivors, and that any measures launched to address crimes against Yazidis would need to take a nuanced approach to ideas of forgiveness and reconciliation.
The respondents' views on forgiveness are also connected to their views on future protection for the community. Many respondents seem to be aware that 'genocide' refers to the intent to persecute and destroy Yazidis as a religious group. Many respondents spoke about the attacks in terms of a betrayal by neighbours and surrounding populations, and a failure to protect the Yazidi community. Distrust of Muslims was a theme that came up repeatedly. Again, further research is needed to ascertain how closely the respondents' views in Germany reflect widely held community beliefs, especially among those still living in Iraq. A more complete understanding of these opinions is important at a time when more than 230,000 Yazidis are still displaced in Kurdistan or as refugees outside Iraq, and international donors are assisting Yazidis to return to Sinjar. The lack of trust in the government also undermines the perception of serious guarantees of security, an important precondition for returns. The results highlight that the return of displaced people is dependent on guaranteeing security and, if possible, engendering trust, as much as it is about physical reconstruction and the restoration of services.
Based on the respondents' views, the goal of ensuring a sustainable future for Yazidis in Iraq is also related to establishing the truth of what happened under ISIS. The respondents express a high level of support for establishing the truth. The most common reason for knowing what happened, and telling the world and future generations about it, was so that Yazidis would be warned and protect themselves from attack in the future. This relates to the Yazidi history of persecution and their perceived need for future protective measures. For transitional justice efforts, it points to establishing truth as a means of guaranteeing non-repetition of violence.
Conclusion
This study was conducted among women who survived the initial Sinjar attacks and subsequent captivity and are now refugees in Germany. Similar research should be implemented for other individuals and groups affected by ISIS to more generally understand the needs and demands for transitional justice. The results for this group show basic physiological and safety needs are still the priority, as well as needs to find the missing and reunify families. Nevertheless, there is a strong demand for truth and justice, and recognition of the genocide, truth-seeking, and criminal prosecution are seen as important steps generally, and as a means towards the protection of Yazidis. There is also strong support for revenge and the death penalty. Such retaliation is unlikely to be supported by the international community and is unlikely to be achieved on a large scale through the Iraqi justice system. This will potentially result in unresolved tensions, resentment and grievances that may fuel future cycles of violence. In response, a comprehensive transitional justice process is needed. Such a process has never happened in Iraq despite the decades of violence in the country. It will be challenging to mobilize domestic and international support for one now. However, other contexts offer some degree of promise: in June 2019, the Ugandan cabinet approved a comprehensive Transitional Justice Policy that was more than ten years in the making. The policy awaits enactment by the Ugandan parliament.
According to respondents in the Special Quota group in Germany, accounting for missing persons should be Iraq's priority, and Germany should prioritize family reunification. Respondents also prioritize returns to Sinjar and ensuring basic needs for Yazidis. Respondents see truth-seeking and recording the history of the ISIS attacks as a core part of protection, since it puts the younger generation on notice about the extent of persecution of Yazidis.
Reforms of the justice sector, and effective investigations and prosecutions of ISIS members, may be acceptable substitutes for the death penalty if implemented in a manner that victims perceive as inclusive and legitimate. A comprehensive transitional justice process, however, will require both sustained political leadership and domestic and international support. Suspending or abolishing death sentences might facilitate greater international involvement in future judicial processes but would take significant public information, and the management of many survivors' expectations of retribution, to provide a form of justice survivors will accept.
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